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I. INTRODUCTION 
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) recently published for 
comment a draft regulation entitled “Best Practices for the 
Licensing of Genomic Inventions.”1  The NIH believes that 
“[a]necdotal and empirical data is beginning to reveal a pattern of 
exclusive licensing practices for genomic technologies . . . that 
could have detrimental effects on . . . the quantity and quality of 
healthcare products and services.”2  The NIH recommends 
granting exclusive licenses when “necessary to encourage research 
and development by private partners” and non-exclusive licenses 
“whenever possible.”3  In contrast, a spokesperson for the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) states unequivocally 
that there is no “evidence that the patenting of gene-related 
inventions is impeding progress.”4 
This comment surveys the costs of deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) diagnostic tests and argues in favor of non-exclusive 
licensing as a means to provide broad access to affordable DNA 
diagnostic testing.  Part II provides background information on 
genetic testing, patenting genes as applied to genetic testing, the 
Bayh-Dole Act, and technology transfer.5  In addition, Part II 
summarizes academic commentary regarding the implications of 
exclusive licensing for biotechnology.6  Scholars propose a number 
of solutions, including expanding the experimental use exception.7  
 
 1. Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions, 69 Fed. Reg. 
67747 (proposed Nov. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Licensing Genomic Inventions]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 67748. 
 4. Lee Drutman, It’s in the Genes: Patent Barriers to Genetic Research, 25 
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR 17 (July 1, 2004). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
2
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Part III details proposed rulemaking for DNA diagnostics.8  Part IV 
reviews anecdotal examples of genetic testing for breast cancer, 
hereditary hemochromatosis, and Canavan Disease.9  These genetic 
testing examples include survey evidence from clinical 
laboratorians.10  The survey and anecdotal evidence indicates that 
patents may increase prices and reduce access to genetic testing.  
This note contends that, although only a partial solution, Licensing 
Genomic Inventions addresses genetic tests developed with NIH 
funding.11  This comment also discusses improvements to the draft 
language.12  Part V concludes that exclusive licensing increases the 
prices of and decreases access to diagnostic genetic tests.13  
Licensing Genomic Inventions means to address the patent 




A. Genetic Testing 
 
An all-inclusive definition of genetic testing is the “analysis of 
human DNA, RNA [ribonucleic acid], chromosomes, proteins, and 
certain metabolites in order to detect heritable disease-related 
genotypes, mutations, phenotypes, or karyotypes for clinical 
purposes.”14  Genetic testing can provide clinical benefits as well as 
diagnostic information to aid in difficult clinical decision-making.15  
Most genetic testing involves rare diseases, but the scope is 
expanding to include genetic risk assessment for common diseases 
such as cancer and cardiovascular disease.16  With some genetic 
tests, however, “[t]he identification of risk does not necessarily lead 
to treatment options.”17 
 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See infra Part V. 
 14. Wylie Burke, Genetic Testing, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1867, 1867 (2002) 
(citation ommited). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 1868.  With Huntington’s disease, which currently has no treatment, 
it is possible to associate the severity and onset of the disease with the length of 
repeated non-coding regions within the gene.  See id.  The individual choice to 
undergo testing is thus potentially psychologically harmful.  Id. at 1867-70.  In the 
3
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DNA diagnostic tests encompass a subset of genetic testing.  
DNA diagnostic tests recently came to the forefront of genetic 
testing because of the DNA sequence information that emanated 
from the Human Genome Project, the availability of inexpensive 
molecular genetic technologies (such as polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR)), and the existence of a genetic component in nearly every 
disease.18  One can obtain genetic testing information through a 
variety of molecular analyses.19 
Currently, there are clinical tests for more than 790 diseases.20  
New genetic associations between molecular markers and diseases 
are published monthly; these new genetic associations make tests 
available for an increased number of diseases.21  Mass screening has 
begun for cystic fibrosis while screening for a variety of other 
diseases has been discussed.22  In addition, biological, 
methodological, ethical, and social complexities involved in genetic 
testing affect genetic tests for disease associations.23  Concerns 
persist regarding the possible effect genetic testing has on 
obtaining insurance coverage.24 
 
United Kingdom, only about twenty percent of those at risk for Huntington’s 
disease undergo the test.  Id. at 1870. 
 18. Wayne Grody, Molecular Genetic Risk Screening, 54 ANN. REV. MED. 473, 474 
(2003). 
 19. Molecular biological techniques used in genetic testing include: DNA 
sequencing, Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) analysis (also 
termed Southern blot hybridization), RNA expression analysis, PCR amplification, 
fluorescent in situ hybridization, and cytogenetic analysis.  Peter Kopp & J. Larry 
Jameson, TRANSMISSION OF HUMAN DISEASE in PRINCIPLES OF MOLECULAR MEDICINE 
50 (J.L. Jameson ed., 1998). 
 20. University of Washington-Seattle, GeneTests: Medical Genetics Information 
Resource Database Online (1995-2005), at http://www.genetests.org (last visited Feb. 
11, 2005) [hereinafter GeneTests]. 
 21. There are currently 1637 clinical disorders for which a genetic mutation 
is known.  Online Mendelian Inheritance in Man, at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 
/entrez/query.fcgi?db=OMIM (last visited Jan. 11, 2005). 
 22. Grody, supra note 18, at 473.  Diseases for which mass screening has been 
discussed include hereditary hemochromatosis, thrombophilias, familial cancer 
predisposition, and pharmacogenetic risk factors.  Id. 
 23. See id. at 475-76. 
 24. According to the National Library of Medicine, “[i]n many cases, health 
insurance plans will cover the costs of genetic testing when it is recommended by a 
person's doctor. . . .  [But different] health insurance providers have different 
policies about which tests are covered. . . .  [In addition, individuals] may choose 
not to use their insurance to pay for testing because the results of a genetic test 
can affect a person's health insurance coverage.”  Will Health Insurance Cover the 
Costs of Genetic Testing?, U.S. National Library of Medicine, at 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/info=genetictesting/show/insurance_coverage (last 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss3/10
10WECK.DOC 3/13/2005  4:31:31 PM 
2005] EXCLUSIVE LICENSING OF DNA DIAGNOSTICS 1061 
A large number of laboratories and clinics perform genetic 
tests.25  Currently, genetic testing is accomplished with “home-brew” 
tests performed in-house by the manufacturer and marketer, and 
thus the tests fall outside the Food and Drug Administration’s 
(FDA’s) review.26  With demand for genetic tests expected to grow, 
manufacturers propose diversified FDA regulation in this area of 
the medical laboratory.27 
B. Patenting Genes 
In a landmark patent decision, the Supreme Court granted 
patent protection to living organisms as long as the organisms 
remain “human-made” and not “products of nature.”28  Dr. Ananda 
Chakrabarty “constructed” a microorganism containing a number 
of different plasmids that allowed it to digest hydrocarbons.29  In 
reaching its decision, the Supreme Court invoked the language 
from the 1952 Patent Act, which states that “anything under the 
sun that is made by man” is patentable.30  This watershed decision 
ultimately resulted in the development of the biotechnology 
industry by providing patent protection for biological inventions.31  
 
visited Feb. 11, 2005). 
 25. See Kopp & Jameson, supra note 19.  A voluntary listing of laboratories 
indicates that 575 laboratories and 1078 clinics perform genetic testing services.  
GeneTests, supra note 20. 
 26. See Michael J. Malinowski & Robin J.R. Blatt, Commercialization of Genetic 
Testing Services: The FDA, Market Forces, and Biological Tarot Cards, 71 TUL. L. REV. 
1211, 1211, 1229-32 (1997) (concluding “that the present regulatory system is 
inadequate and places a dangerous amount of reliance on primary care 
physicians”). 
 27. See Elizabeth Mansfield, Genetic Testing and Personalized Medicine: An FDA 
View, 1 PRECLINICA 155 (2003).  Laboratory tests, regulated under the Clinical 
Laboratory Improvements Amendments of 1988 (CLIA), involve emphasis on 
analytical test performance and quality control.  Steven Gutman & David W. Feigel 
Jr., The Status of ASR Regulations (May 2004), available at 
http://www.devicelink.com /ivdt/archive/04/05/007.html.  In 1997, the FDA 
began regulating components of in-house tests and analyzing specific reagents 
(ASRs).  See id.  ASRs include nucleic acid sequences and similar reagents 
intended for use in a diagnostic application for identification of a substance in 
biological specimens.  Id.  Manufacturers propose a new regulatory category 
termed in vitro analytical tests (IVAT) for which analytical utility is established but 
clinical utility has not yet been proven.  Id. 
 28. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980). 
 29. Id. at 305. 
 30. Id. at 309 (citations omitted). 
 31. DAVID B. RESNIK, OWNING THE GENOME: A MORAL ANALYSIS OF DNA 
PATENTING 67 (2004). 
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Recently, United States courts have upheld the patenting of genes 
from mammals and plants.32 
In 1982, the United States Patent Office issued the first gene 
patent to the Regents of the University of California for work 
carried out on the construction of a plasmid contained in a 
bacterium and expression of genes for chorionic 
somatomammotropin.33  Two years later, one of the first patent 
claims for diagnostic detection of a disease gene was for the 
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) test for 
Huntington’s disease.34  Thus, courts uphold gene patents in 
diagnostic use claims. 
An invention in a United States patent application must satisfy 
the utility requirement.35  The invention must contain a specific, 
substantial, and credible utility.36  As a result, the utility 
requirement precludes patenting inventions such as the use of a 
DNA sequence as landfill.37  It is also possible to satisfy the utility 
requirement by showing a readily apparent and well-established 
utility.38 
Recently, the first gene patent was issued to a patient advocacy 
group.39  The four co-inventors from Hawaii assigned their rights to 
 
 32. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 
(2001) (affirming right to patent plant material); U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 
(issued Apr. 12, 1988) (issuing patent for non-naturally occurring genetically 
altered oncomouse). 
 33. U.S. Patent No. 4,363,877 (issued Dec. 14, 1982) (claiming “6. A 
recombinant DNA transfer vector comprising codons for human growth 
hormone”).  Chorionic somatomammotropin is commonly known as the “human 
growth” hormone.  Id. 
 34. U.S. Patent No. 4,666,828 (issued May 19, 1987) (claiming “1. A method 
for detecting the presence in a subject of the gene for Huntington's Disease which 
comprises: analyzing the human chromosome 4 of said subject for a DNA 
polymorphism linked to Huntington's Disease. 2. The method of claim 1 wherein 
said polymorphism is a restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP).”).  The 
patent was filed on August 15, 1984.  Id. 
 35. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112, (1952). 
 36. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1097-98 (proposed 
Jan. 15, 2001) (internal regulation to be used by U.S. PTO personnel in their 
review of patent applications for compliance with the "utility" requirement of 35 
U.S.C. § 101). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Press Release, PXE International, U.S. Patent Office Issues First Gene 
Patent to Patient Advocacy Group: Co-Inventors Include Non-Scientist “Mom” 
(Aug. 24, 2004),  at http://www.pxe.org/patent.html; Methods for diagnosing 
Pseudoxanthoma elasticum, U.S. Patent No. 6,780,587 (issued Aug. 24, 2004) 
(claiming “a method for screening a patient for the presence of the PXE mutation 
6
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the University of Hawaii, which assigned its rights to the patient 
advocacy group.40  Assignment of patent rights to advocacy groups 
may have important implications for future disease gene diagnostic 
patenting and test development.  This could direct licensing 
income obtained from genetic testing to further research and 
development in addition to treatment for a specific genetic disease. 
C. Patenting Genes in Europe and Canada 
In Europe, patents are awarded upon successful 
demonstration of novelty, utility, and an inventive step.41  
Additionally, patents must satisfy a moral requirement.42 The 
oncomouse patent was not as broad when issued in Europe, 
because it applied only to mice and not all rodents.43  In contrast, 
Canada refuses to allow the oncomouse patent to issue because it 
rebuffs the idea that life forms are patentable.44 
In the future, the Biotechnology Patents Directive “98/44” will 
control European gene patents.45  Under the Directive, Article 5 
allows the patenting of genes identical to those in the human body 
 
. . .”). 
 40. See Press Release, PXE International, supra note 39. 
 41. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (Oct. 5, 1973), Art. 52, 
available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar52.html#A52. 
 42. Id. at Art. 53 (stating “European patents shall not be granted in respect 
of: (a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to 
‘ordre public’ or morality, provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to 
be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of 
the Contracting States; (b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals; this provision does not apply to 
microbiological processes or the products thereof.”). 
 43. “EPO Oncomouse ruling,” News in Brief, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 937 
(2004). 
 44. Harvard Coll. v. Can. Comm’r of Patents, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (holding that 
a higher life form is not patentable under the Canadian Patent Act because it is 
not a “manufacture” or “composition of matter” within the meaning of 
“invention”). 
 45. Council Directive 98/44/EC, Art. 5, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 18 (stating that 
“1. The human body, at the various stages of its formation and development, and 
the simple discovery of one of its elements, including the sequence or partial 
sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable inventions.  2. An element 
isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical 
process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a 
patentable invention, even if the structure of that element is identical to that of a 
natural element.  3. The industrial application of a sequence or a partial sequence 
of a gene must be disclosed in the patent application.”), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/l_213/l21319980730en001300 
21.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004). 
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as long as the patent application discloses an “industrial 
application.”46 
Although Switzerland is not a member of the European Union 
(EU), it is working on draft guidelines to put Swiss patent law in 
line with 98/44.47  While the EU directive is silent on the scope of 
protection, the proposed Swiss patent guidelines restrict a patent 
on a gene sequence to a specific, credible, and non-speculative 
function.48  By limiting patent protection to the specific utility 
claimed, the Swiss Patent Office believes the limitation will 
stimulate specific gene research exploration for additional 
utilities.49 
Between 2001 and 2003, Myriad Genetics received four 
European patents for testing susceptibility to breast cancer and 
ovarian cancer.50  These patents were challenged by the Institut 
Curie (Paris, France), and the BRCA2 gene test (EP 785216) was 
overturned by the European Patent Office (EPO) in February 
2004.51  In addition, the EPO revoked one of the BRCA1 gene tests 
(EP 699754) in May 2004.52  The EPO found the BRCA1 patent 
inadequately inventive under the provisions of European patent 
law.53  In contrast, Cancer Research UK received a patent on 
BRCA2 in Europe and will make BRCA2 screening widely available 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Jane Burgermeister, Swiss Patent Proposal Prompts Criticism, 22 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1323, 1323 (2004). 
 48. Id.  “Art. 8c (new) If the discovery relates to a non-synthetically developed 
sequence or partial sequence the coverage is limited to the concrete functions 
described in its patent. Art. 49 The patent application must contain: f. in the case 
of a nucleotide sequence or partial sequence or partial sequence of a gene, a 
concrete description of its function.” Bundesgesetz über die Erfindungspatente 
(proposed alteration of the June 1954 Patent Act), available at 
http://www.ige.ch/D/jurinfo/documents/j10013d.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2004). 
 49. Burgermeister, supra note 47, at 1323. 
 50. European Patent No. 699754 (issued Jan. 10, 2001); European Patent No. 
705903 (issued May 23, 2001); European Patent No. 705902 (issued Nov. 28, 2001) 
(describing BRCA1-related inventions); European Patent No. 785216 (issued Jan. 
8, 2003) (describing BRCA2-related invention). 
 51. Graeme O’Neill, How Myriad’s GCAT got out of the bag, AUSTRALIAN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS,  Jun. 21, 2004, at 1, available at http://esvc001057.wic005u. 
server-web.com/archives/1/220/447/How%20Myriads%20GCAT%20got% 
20out% 20of%20the%20bag%2024062004.pdf. 
 52. Press Release, European Patent Office, Myriad/Breast Cancer Patent 
Revoked After Public Hearing (May 18, 2004), available at http://www.european-
patent-office.org/news/pressrel/2004_05_18_e.htm. 
 53. Andrew Pollack, European Patent on U.S. Gene Test is Revoked, INTL. HERALD 
TRI., May 20, 2004, at 16, available at 2004 WL 77528899, at *1. 
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across Europe.54 
There is a belief in Europe that gene patents will have a 
negative influence on providing healthcare.55  It is feared that the 
BRCA1 gene patents will create a precedent.56  Due to the large 
number of patent applications on genes filed over the last few 
years, there are concerns that monopoly rights to genes and 
genetic testing will undermine reimbursement systems and 
negatively influence European healthcare.57 
D. The Bayh-Dole Act 
The policy and objective of the Bayh-Dole Act58 (Act) is “to 
promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally 
supported research or development” and “to promote the 
commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the 
United States.”59  The Act sponsors believed that university 
ownership of patent rights would allow the grant of exclusive 
licenses to private firms.60  The sponsors thought university 
ownership was necessary for the development of commercial 
products from government-sponsored research discoveries.61 
The Act permits universities to “retain title to any subject 
invention”62 and subjects universities to “a requirement that the 
contractor share royalties with the inventor.”63  The Act specifies 
that any remaining royalties “shall be used by the contractor for 
 
 54. Press Release, Cancer Research UK, Charities to Make Breast Cancer 
(BRCA2) Gene Freely Available Across Europe (Feb. 11, 2004),  at 
http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/news/pressreleases/breastcancergene_11feb04
?version=1. 
 55. Swiss Society of Medical Genetics, BCRA1 Patent,   at http://www.ssgm.ch 
/sections/News/brca1testing.htm (last visited Aug. 31. 2004). 
 56. Press Release, Curie Institut, European-Wide Opposition Against the 
Breast Cancer Patents (Sept. 26, 2002), at http://www.curie.fr/upload/presse/ 
europeanoppmyriad _sept02_gb.pdf. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019 (1980) 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (1994)). 
 59. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1952). 
 60. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Public Domain: Bayh-Dole Reform 
and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290 (2003). 
 61. Id. 
 62. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2004) (stating that “[e]ach nonprofit organization or 
small business firm may, within a reasonable time after disclosure as required by 
paragraph (c)(1) of this section, elect to retain title to any subject invention.”). 
 63. Id. § 202(c)(7)(B). 
9
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scientific research, development, and education.”64  While rights 
were originally granted to nonprofit organizations and small 
companies, President Reagan extended these rights to large 
corporations.65  The Act also prescribes “march-in rights” to allow 
the federal agency responsible for funding the invention to require 
“the contractor . . . to grant a nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or 
exclusive license in any field of use to a responsible applicant” if 
certain conditions are not met.66  Exercise of march-in rights may 
be necessary in the following situations: 
• if “effective steps” have not been taken “to achieve 
practical application of the subject invention;” 
• to “alleviate health or safety needs;” 
• “to meet requirements for public use specified by 
federal regulations;” or 
• if the subject invention is not manufactured 
substantially in the United States.67 
In a few publicly known cases, NIH commented on the 
exercise of march-in rights and then refused to exert them.  In the 
first case, CellPro petitioned NIH to enforce its march-in rights to 
four federally funded Johns Hopkins University (JHU) patents that 
JHU had licensed to Baxter Health Care Corporation.68  CellPro 
wanted NIH to intervene to alleviate alleged health or safety needs 
because the infringement of CellPro’s patents on those of Baxter 
Healthcare precluded further sale of a stem cell separation device.69  
NIH stated that both companies failed to present evidence that cell 
separation devices improve stem cell engraftment, disease free 
survival, or overall survival.70  Thus, NIH declined to intervene and 
 
 64. Id. § 202(c)(7)(E)(i). 
 65. Exec. Order No. 12,591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (Apr. 10, 1987), as amended 
by Exec. Order No. 12,618, 52 Fed. Reg. 48,661 (Dec. 22, 1987) (allowing 
executive departments to enter into cooperative research projects with the private 
sector, and providing ownership of title to patents resulting from research to the 
contractors in exchange for royalty-free use by the government). 
 66. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2004). 
 67. Id.  §§ 203(a)(1)-(4) to 204 (2004). 
 68. See Barbara M. McGarey & Annette C. Levey, Patents, Products, and Public 
Health: An Analysis of the CellPro March-In Petition, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095 
(1999). 
 69. Harold Varmus, M.D., National Institutes of Health, Office of the 
Director, Determination in the Case of Petition of CellPro, Inc., (Aug. 1, 1997), 
available at http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/aug97/nihb-01.htm. 
 70. Id. 
10
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exercise march-in rights either for health or safety reasons71 or for 
inability to “achieve practical application of the subject invention in 
such field of use.”72 
NIH more recently declined to exercise march-in rights in a 
case where the price quadrupled for Abbott Laboratories’ (Abbott) 
Norvir® (ritonavir), a drug used to treat patients with HIV/AIDS.73  
NIH had funded preclinical research for about $3.5 million and 
Abbott had invested over three hundred million dollars to continue 
developing the drug in an effort to bring it to market.74  Following a 
public hearing on May 25, 2004, NIH found that Abbott sufficiently 
showed the practical application of the subject invention under 35 
U.S.C. § 203(a) because of the “manufacture, practice and 
operation of ritonavir and the drug’s availability and use by the 
public.”75  The complainants presented no evidence at the hearing 
to show that march-in rights could alleviate any health or safety 
needs not reasonably satisfied by Abbott.76  NIH agreed with public 
testimony that the exercise of march-in rights was not an 
appropriate way to address drug prices, but instead suggested that 
Congress should address the issue.77  NIH maintained that the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the appropriate agency to 
address any question of anticompetitive behavior by Abbott.78 
E. Experimental Use Exemption 
Statutory and common law components define the 
experimental use defense in the United States.79  The Hatch-
Waxman Act80 created a statutory experimental use defense and 
gave proprietary pharmaceutical manufacturers a patent extension 
 
 71. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 203 (a)(2) (2004). 
 72. Varmus, supra note 69; see also 35 U.S.C. § 203 (a)(1) (2004). 
 73. Elias A. Zerhouni, M.D., National Institute of Health, Office of the 
Director, In the Case of Norvir® Manufactured by Abbott Laboratories, Inc., (July 
29, 2004), available at http://ott.od.nih.gov/Reports/March-In-Norvir.pdf. 
 74. Bonnie Joy Sedlak, National Institutes of Health Decides Not to March in: 
Exploring the Decision Reached in the Case of Abbott’s Norvir, 24 GENETIC ENGINEERING 
NEWS 1, 18 (2004). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for 
an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 459 (2004). 
 80. Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)). 
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to cover delays in testing obligations.81  This statutory use defense 
was “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs. . . .”82 
Two recent cases highlight what remains of the experimental 
use defense.  The Madey v. Duke University decision essentially 
eliminated the common law experimental use defense for 
universities.83  Duke University was using patented laser technology 
in its teaching and research laboratory.84  In that case, the court 
concluded “the experimental use defense persists albeit in [a] very 
narrow form. . . .”85  The court followed reasoning in Embrex, where 
the court interpreted the experimental use defense narrowly and 
limited its scope to actions performed “for amusement, to satisfy 
idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.”86  Madey’s 
holding may mean that most university research will fail to fall 
within the research exception.87 
Integra Lifesciences I v. Merck KGaA highlights how narrowly 
courts interpret the statutory defense.88  In Integra, the defendants 
used a peptide, employed originally in wound healing, in 
experiments to identify the best drug for halting tumor growth.89  
The court found the new use of halting tumor growth fell short of 
benefiting from the statutory experimental use defense because the 
“statutory language strictly limits the exemption ‘solely’ to uses with 
a reasonable relationship to FDA procedures.”90 
The doctrine exempting experimental use from infringement 
has considerably more breadth in Europe and Japan than in the 
United States.91  Various European states define the experimental 
 
 81. Dreyfuss, supra note 79, at 459. 
 82. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e)(1) (West 2004). 
 83. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 
958 (2003). 
 84. Id. at 1352. 
 85. Id. at 1361. 
 86. Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(citations omitted). 
 87. Dreyfuss, supra note 79, at 461. 
 88. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 89. Id. at 863. “The Scripps-Merck experiments did not supply information 
for submission to the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), but 
instead identified the best drug candidate to subject to future clinical testing 
under the FDA processes.”  Id. at 865. 
 90. Id. at 866. 
 91. Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use 
Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 37-38 
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use exception in their patent law.92  Under German law, the 
patentee’s rights do “not extend to acts performed for 
experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the 
patented invention.”93  “French law provides that ‘acts 
accomplished for personal or domestic purposes or for the purpose 
of testing the object of the patented invention shall not be 
considered as affecting the patentee’s rights.’”94  Japanese law 
provides that “‘the effects of the patent right shall not extend to the 
working of the patent right for the purposes of experiment or 
research.’”95 
F.  Exclusive Versus Non-exclusive Licensing 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that exclusive licensing of DNA 
diagnostics hinders innovation, reduces quality, sidesteps 
regulatory approval, and increases costs.96  Patented diagnostics do 
not allow the study of a gene in local laboratories if all the samples 
must be shipped off to a reference laboratory.97  A broad-based 
preliminary survey showed that non-profit organizations licensed 
DNA inventions exclusively at more than twice the rate of 
companies.98 
Additional survey evidence indicates that in the previous three 
years, nearly twenty percent of life science faculty have delayed 
publication of research results by at least six months to pursue a 
patent application.99  In addition, the most productive laboratories 
 
(2001). 
 92. See id. at 39. 
 93. Id. at 38 (citations omitted). 
 94. Id. n.187 (citations omitted). 
 95. Id. at 39 (citations omitted). 
 96. Shanshan Zhang, High Tech Law Institute Publications: Proposing Resolutions 
to the Insufficient Gene Patent System, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
1139, 1158-59 (2004). 
 97. O’Neill, supra note 51. 
 98. Michelle R. Henry et al., A Pilot Survey on the Licensing of DNA Inventions, 
31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 442, 444 (2003). 
 99. David Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life 
Science: Evidence from a National Survey of Faculty, 277 JAMA 1224 (1997).  The 3394 
faculty members in the fifty universities receiving the most NIH funding in 1993 
were asked whether they had “delayed publication of their research results for 
more than [six] months” and whether they had “refused to share research results 
with other university scientists in the last three years.”  Id.  “A total of 410 
respondents (19.8%) reported that publication of their research results had been 
delayed by more than [six] months at least once in the last [three] years to allow 
for patent application, to protect their scientific lead, to slow the dissemination of 
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maintained the most pronounced delays.100  In another series of 
interviews with clinical laboratories, responses indicated patented 
tests stopped laboratories from performing some diagnostic genetic 
tests.101 
Companies and non-profit institutions differ in their strategy 
and breadth of patent coverage and the extent to which exclusive 
licenses are used.  Generally, non-profits grant more licenses that 
are exclusive.102  There is also a concern that raising the cost of 
access to diagnostic technologies through patents may be retarding 
the pace of biomedical discovery.103  Industry and researchers argue 
over how valid the data is that supports these contentions.104  
Royalties on diagnostic tests account for two to ten percent of the 
test cost and in the absence of commercial tests, individual 
hospitals would be responsible for test development costs.105 
G. Criticisms of Bayh-Dole Act Relative to DNA Diagnostics 
Two critics argue that Bayh-Dole went too far in making results 
of publicly funded research in the health arena patentable at the 
expense of benefits to the general public.  Rai and Eisenberg 
contend that the Bayh-Dole Act should be “reformed” to give 
funding agencies greater discretion to determine when to require 
that publicly funded research discoveries be dedicated to the public 
domain.106 
 
undesired results, to allow time to negotiate a patent, or to resolve disputes over 
the ownership of intellectual property. Also, 181 respondents (8.9%) reported 
refusing to share research results with other university scientists in the last [three] 
years.”  Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of 
Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3 (2003). 
 102. See Henry, supra note 98, at 447.  A 1999 survey indicated that sixteen 
percent of licenses granted by NIH were exclusive while fifty percent of licenses 
granted by universities were exclusive.  Id.  Furthermore, companies reported 
granting an average of twenty-seven percent exclusive licenses for all licenses 
granted while for non-profits the average was sixty-eight percent.  Id. at 444. 
 103. John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021 
(2003). 
 104. See Henry, supra note 98 (arguing that patents have a negative impact on 
the cost and availability of genetic testing); Ken Chahine, Industry Opposes Genomic 
Legislation, 20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 419 (2002) (arguing that in the long term 
the lack of patent protection for diagnostic tests would have a negative impact on 
biotech funding). 
 105. See Chahine, supra note 104. 
 106. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of 
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1. The Tragedy of the Anticommons 
The tragedy of the commons theory was originally proposed to 
explain the overuse of resources owned in common with no 
incentive for conservation.107  The theory predicts that privatization 
of public resources would increase resource utilization 
effectiveness.108  The anticommons effect unexpectedly results from 
encouraging privatization, whereas a proliferation of patents on 
upstream inventions discourages the development of downstream 
inventions.109  Some experts argue this could stifle important 
medical inventions.110  Heller and Eisenberg famously posited the 
“tragedy of the anticommons” to suggest that scarce resources are 
underutilized because too many owners can block each other.111 
These blocking patents also referred to as a “patent thicket,” 
consist of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company 
must attempt to navigate through in order to commercialize a new 
technology.112  With too many patents, a company may not develop 
a new product because of the fear of infringement.  When a single 
firm did not control the components of the production of brass, 
copper, and zinc, the price of brass was higher and this illustrates 
the problem of complementary monopolies.113  In addition, the 
profits of the producers were shown to be lower.114  This is similar 
to the current problem in many industries with a large number of 
upstream patent holders possibly preventing the development of 
new technology. 
2. Responses to the Anticommons Argument 
The anticommons hypothesis has generated a powerful 
paradigm in which one can examine the effects of patenting on 
innovation and use of technology in the biotechnology field.  
 
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 291 (2003). 
 107. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? 
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. CARL SHAPIRO, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard-Setting, INNOVATION POLICY & THE ECONOMY 119, 123 (Adam Jaffe et al. 
eds., 2001), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf. 
 113. Id. at 124-25. 
 114. Id. at 125. 
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There have been a number of academic comments published 
regarding the anticommons theory.  A sample of the representative 
arguments is presented below. 
a. No Anticommons Problem 
Some commentators have concluded that there is no 
anticommons problem.  Professor Merges notes that in some cases, 
commercial firms have been injecting information into the public 
domain.115  As an example, biotechnology firms invested millions of 
dollars in public domain gene sequence databases to prevent the 
hold-up of their research by patents issued on short gene 
sequences.116  The issuance of these first patents on single 
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) led ten pharmaceutical 
companies to establish the SNP Consortium in 1999.117  The 
original goal of the SNP Consortium was to place 300,000 SNPs 
throughout the human genome in the public domain.118  The final 
release of the SNP Consortium placed 1.25-million SNPs in the 
public domain.119 Professor Merges believes that policy makers 
should examine these private sector responses before 
implementing major changes in response to an anticommons 
situation.120 
Professor Kieff disagrees with the possible negative effects of 
the anticommons theory and believes that patents on inputs do not 
decrease production of outputs.121  There is a large incentive for 
biotechnology patentees to license technology as a means of 
reducing the risk of commercialization.122  This incentive makes 
sense for “Big Pharma,” where the cost of commercializing a new 
drug may average $800 million and fifteen years.123  Once a 
 
 115. Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
183, 190 (2004). 
 116. Id. at 183. 
 117. Id. at 190. 
 118. Id. 
 119. The SNP Consortium Ltd., SNP Data Release Notes, available at 
http://snp.cshl.org/about/2001_TSC_project_overview.shtml (last visited Jan. 20, 
2005). The tenth release, in September 2001, of the SNP Consortium database 
contained 1,255,326 SNPs anchored to the human genome.  Id. 
 120. Merges, supra note 115, at 190. 
 121. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing 
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 720 (2000). 
 122. Id. at 726. 
 123. Joseph S. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimate of Drug 
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003).  Depending on the drug 
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company develops a technology, the company likely licenses the 
technology to hedge risk in areas ancillary to the business.124 
Professor Walsh and collaborators found that restricted access 
to upstream technology “has not been especially problematic” in 
impeding innovation in biomedical research.125  These 
commentators concluded that the possibility exists where access to 
upstream technologies is impeded and this requires ongoing 
scrutiny.126  More specifically, survey respondents reported that 
negotiations over rights to intellectual property from many owners 
seldom result in a project’s cancellation.127  The total royalty 
payments for multiple input technologies in a drug development 
program range from one to five percent of sales, and are somewhat 
higher for exclusive licenses.128  The cost of purchasing patented 
reagents was found to be two to four times higher than making in-
house versions of the same reagents.129 
b. Anticommons Problem 
Conversely, other authors believe that there is an 
anticommons problem and have proposed various solutions.  
Professor Mueller suggests that it is possible to resolve the 
anticommons problem.  Mueller suggests expanding the 
experimental use doctrine so that researchers may use patented 
research tools for follow-on research without automatic 
disqualification from the experimental use doctrine.130  Professor 
Mueller argues that a researcher who does not hold the patent to a 
 
industry’s accounting, the industry’s $800 million figure may be an overestimate. 
Half of the $800 million involves “opportunity costs” with the money if invested in 
equities.  Removal of built-in profits would make the research and development 
costs $108 million ninety-three percent of the time and $400 million seven percent 
of the time. The $800 million estimate also fails to include taxpayer subsidies 
through deductions and credits.  Donald W. Light & Joel Lexchin, Will Lower Drug 
Prices Jeopardize Drug Research?, Physicians for a National Health Program, available 
at http://www.pnhp.org/news/2004/february/will _lower_drug_pric.php (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2005). 
 124. See Kieff, supra note 121, at 726. 
 125. JOHN P. WALSH ET AL., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on 
Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 331 
(Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 298. 
 128. Id. at 300. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Mueller, supra note 91, at 9 (suggesting this approach where there are 
high transaction costs required for using patented research tools). 
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research tool should be allowed the use of the tool, but any 
products developed as a result would be subject to a “reach-
through” royalty.131  NIH does not favor reach-through royalties 
because they can inhibit downstream research.132  Others have 
suggested that it would be wise to implement an experimental use 
exception, especially for researchers undertaking pre-competitive 
research.133 
Professor Leibovitz intones that non-exclusive patents would 
“alleviate monopolistic power while accommodating the practical 
peculiarities of different situations.”134  He proposes a system that 
does not grant exclusive property rights to inventors.135  These non-
exclusive rights would protect an inventor against “free-riding 
competitors” but would not protect against “competitors who 
independently develop the same technology.”136  Implementation 
of non-exclusive patents would “reduce the possibility of 
anticompetitive behavior in the commercialization of 
technologies.”137  The difficulty in implementing this proposal 
centers on determining in which cases such misappropriation had 
occurred and where monopolistic power could be invoked.138 
Professor Gitter suggests that Congress should create a 
compulsory licensing scheme for patents on human DNA sequence 
and codify the experimental use exception.139  A compulsory 
 
 131. Id. at 55. 
 132. Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and 
Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources, 64 
Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,091 (Dec. 23, 1999) (final notice) 
Royalties on the sale of a final product that does not embody the tool, or 
other reach-through rights directed to a final product that does not 
embody the tool, discourage use of tools and are not appropriate in these 
circumstances. Royalties on the sale of final products are more 
appropriate to situations where a for-profit entity seeks to commercialize 
the tool, e.g., by developing a marketable product or service, or 
incorporating the tool into a marketable product or service. 
Id. 
 133. Sandy Thomas, Reply to “Impact of Patenting on R&D and Commerce,” 21 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 730 (2003); See also David C. Hoffman, Note, A Modest 
Proposal: Toward Improved Access to Biotechnology Research Tools by Implementing a Broad 
Experimental Use Exception, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 993 (2004). 
 134. John S. Leibovitz, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251, 
2265 (2002). 
 135. Id. at 2268. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 2270. 
 138. Id. at 2268. 
 139. Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences 
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licensing scheme would permit further use of the research, and 
allocate royalties for inventors based on the invention’s commercial 
value while allowing researchers access to DNA sequence data at a 
fair price.140  The approach would also allow scientists in public and 
nonprofit institutions to conduct non-commercially oriented 
research free of charge.141  Such an approach would work to 
harmonize United States and European Union patent law.142 
One commentator has proposed amending the Physician 
Immunity Statute to allow patient access to diagnostic testing of any 
gene, whether patented or not.143  In 2002, there was a proposal for 
similar legislation that would have allowed the use of human 
genetic information for research and diagnostic purposes without 
the threat of patent infringement.144  Congress did not pass this 
legislation.145 
Ethicist Williams-Jones notes that “intellectual property 
protection affects the costs and, therefore, the availability of health 
care services . . . .”146  Some commentators’ note that whatever 
portions of public funds are expended on health care, it is 
impossible to cover all beneficial services.147  The increased cost of 
patented genetic tests makes it more difficult to justify providing 
such testing services to the public.148 
The costs of using patented PCR tests and DNA sequencing 
 
in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and 
a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1679 (2001). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Gregory P. Lekovic, Genetic Diagnosis and Intellectual Property Rights: A 
Proposal to Amend “The Physician Immunity Statute,” 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 275, 296 (2004). The author proposed amending 35 U.S.C. § 287 
(c)(2)(A)(iii) to include the words “other than for purposes of diagnosis” thus 
including genetic testing in “medical activity” that is not subject to patent 
infringement.  Id.  
 144. Washington Business Information, Legislation to Exempt Genes Used for 
Diagnostic Purposes, DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC LETTER, March 15, 2002, available at 2002 
WL 8415113. 
 145. The bills were sent to Committee and no further action was taken.  
Legislative Updates, Office of Legislative Policy & Analysis, available at 
http://olpa.od.nih.gov/legislation/107/pendinglegislation/9gene.asp (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2005). 
 146. Bryn Williams-Jones & Michael M. Burgess, Social Contract Theory and Just 
Decision Making: Lessons from Genetic Testing for the BRCA Mutations, 14 KENNEDY 
INST. ETHICS J. 115 (2004). 
 147. Id. at 118. 
 148. Id. at 132. 
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are paid by diagnostics laboratories because the cost of laboratory 
instruments and reagents include the cost of licenses.  In addition, 
commercial testing laboratories pay a fee for each PCR test that 
they perform.149  The patent on PCR encourages laboratories to 
develop alternative technology in order to avoid the cost of PCR.150 
H. The Future of Genetic Testing 
Pharmacogenomics is the study of the effect of genetic 
variation on drug response.151  The regulation of diagnostic genetic 
tests will become increasingly important as pharmacogenomic uses 
increase.152  Diagnostic tests, including genetic tests, can determine 
if a specific individual has the appropriate genetic makeup to 
respond to treatment with a specific therapeutic.153  
Pharmacogenomics, utilizing genetic tests, have been used to 
optimize patient treatment with therapeutics.  The first example of 
this personalized medicine was an HIV test that involved 
genotyping the virus in order to determine which drugs would be 
most effective against a particular virus.154 
The treatment of certain breast cancers with Herceptin 
demonstrates another example of a successful pharmacogenomic 
approach.155  A diagnostic test utilizing either histochemical or 
cellular hybridization methods can determine the status of the 
human epidermal growth factor receptor 2 (HER 2) gene.156  About 
twenty-five percent of breast cancers contain an overabundance of 
either the HER2 gene or too many HER2 receptors.157 Herceptin is 
a monoclonal antibody that binds specifically to HER2 receptors.  
 
 149. Telephone Interview with Matt Bower, Certified Genetic Counselor, 
Fairview University Medical Center (Oct. 22, 2004). 
 150. Id. 
 151. The term pharmacogenomics is often used interchangeably with 
pharmacogenetics.  Cambridge Healthtech Inst., Pharmacogenomic Glossary, 
available at http://www.genomicglossaries.com/content/pharmacogenomics.asp 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2004). 
 152. Kathryn R. Phillips et al., Genetic Testing and Pharmacogenomics: Issues for 
Determining the Impact to Healthcare Delivery and Costs, 10 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 425, 
429 (2004). 
 153. Id. at 426. 
 154. HIV serological diagnosis was the first example of testing to match a 
patient with a treatment, here based on the serotype of the virus. 
 155. Genentech, Inc., How Herceptin Works, available at http://www.hercep 
tin.com/herceptin/patient/f_works/works.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss3/10
10WECK.DOC 3/13/2005  4:31:31 PM 
2005] EXCLUSIVE LICENSING OF DNA DIAGNOSTICS 1077 
When combined with chemotherapy, Herceptin has been shown to 
have a high probability of responding in women of the appropriate 
genotype.158 
The expansion of new market systems will only increase with 
the move to pharmacogenomics.159  A noted biotechnology industry 
analyst has predicted that genetic testing will become increasingly 
routine.160 Healthcare will move toward more “predictive, 
preventative care with [increased] pre-symptomatic [diagnostics] 
and [therapeutic prescriptions].”161  This increased demand for 
predictive genetic testing will require affordability for individual 
tests as multiple genetic tests will likely be run simultaneously. 
III. PROPOSED RULEMAKING: NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSING OF 
GENOMIC INVENTIONS 
In response to perceived inequities in the quantity and quality 
of healthcare services that are dependent upon genomic 
technologies, NIH introduced draft guidelines for the non-
exclusive licensing of genomic inventions, including “nucleic acid-
based diagnostics, potential gene therapy applications, and the 
development of new DNA and RNA-based therapeutics.”162  
Genomic inventions covered in the NIH draft guidelines include: 
“materials such as cDNAs; expressed sequence tags (ESTs); 
haplotypes; antisense molecules; small interfering RNAs (siRNAs); 
full-length genes and their expression products; as well as methods 
and instrumentation for the sequencing of genomes, quantification 
of nucleic acid molecules, detection of single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs), and genetic modifications.”163 
The Draft Best Practices suggests a tripartite plan.  The first 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Nina Flanagan, Tailored Medicine no Longer Science Fiction, 24 GENETIC 
ENGINEERING NEWS 30 (Sept. 30, 2004). 
 160. G. Stephen Burrill, State of the Biotechnology Industry . . . Circa 2004 (Oct. 
11, 2004), available at http://www.burrillandco.com/pdfs/Laguna-Laguna.pdf. 
 161. Id. 
 162. E-mail from Jack Spiegel, Senior Advisor for Technology Transfer 
Operations, Office of Technology Transfer, National Institutes of Health, to 
Edward Weck, student, William Mitchell College of Law (July 1, 2004, 10:08 EST) 
(containing attachments draft Licensing Genomic Inventions and Jack Spriegel, 
Address before the Association of University Technology Managers on Draft Best 
Practices (Mar. 4-6, 2004)) [hereinafter Spriegel Address] (on file with author); 
David Malakoff, NIH Roils Academe with Advice on Licensing DNA Patents, 303 SCI. 
1757 (2004). 
 163. Licensing Genomic Inventions, supra note 1, at 67747. 
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prong seeks “patent protection on genomic inventions [that 
require] significant further research and development by the 
private sector . . . to bring the invention to practical and 
commercial application.”164  The second prong incorporates non-
exclusive licensing “whenever possible [especially for] broad 
enabling technologies and research uses. . . .”165  The third prong 
exclusively licenses technology when “necessary to encourage 
research and development by private partners. . . .”166  Under the 
third prong, it will be important to control the scope of the 
invention by limiting “indications, fields of use, and territories . . . 
to be commensurate with the abilities and commitment of licensees 
to bring the technology to market expeditiously.”167  To ensure 
expeditious development, the Draft Best Practices recommend 
utilizing milestones, benchmarks, and performance-based royalty 
payments; monitoring and enforcing performance; and 
sublicensing.168  It will also be important to address public health 
benefits by: (1) seeking to protect research uses, (2) seeking fair 
return on public investment, (3) recognizing public health goals, 




A. Genetic Testing Introduction 
 
NIH bases the need for rule making on “[a]necdotal and 
empirical data” that “reveal[s] a pattern of exclusive licensing.”170  
In addition, there is a need to “balance[] the expansion of 
knowledge and direct public health benefit with the commercial 
needs of private interests.”171 
Examples of genetic tests previously developed and 
implemented in clinical laboratories are discussed below.  A 
comparison of the tests describes the disease, the genetic defect, 
the type of test, source of funds for test development, and testing 
cost.  The examples described below include the exclusive licensing 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 67748. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Spiegel Address, supra note 162. 
 171. Licensing Genomic Inventions, supra note 1, at 67747. 
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of BRCA1 and BRCA2 by Myriad Genetics, Canavan Disease test 
development, and hereditary hemochromatosis testing.172  These 
examples are compared with non-exclusive licenses for Cystic 
Fibrosis and Huntington Disease testing.  Finally, there is the 
recent example of the PXE disease gene patent that is issued to an 
individual followed by licensing to a patient advocacy group.173 
1. Breast/Ovarian Cancer Testing with BRCA1/BRCA2 
Mutations in both BRCA1 and BRCA2 result in a 
predisposition to breast cancer, ovarian cancer, prostate cancer 
(BRCA1), as well as other cancers (BRCA2).174  The risk of 
developing cancers associated with these genes is unknown and 
appears to be “variable even within families of similar ethnic 
background with the same mutation.”175  Of women diagnosed with 
breast cancer each year, “only 5 to 10% are likely to have [a genetic 
predisposition] associated with increased risk of developing the 
disease.”176  Depending on the specific mutation and family history, 
the “cumulative lifetime risk is 40 to 85% for breast cancer, and 16 
to 40% for ovarian cancer. . . .”177  “But even [with these] very 
accurate testing methods, only 20 to 25% of patients with a strong 
family history... will have a positive BRCA mutation. . . .”178  This 
means that for “75 to 80% of breast cancer patients, the heritable 
component of their [disease] remains unknown.”179  In addition to 
the genetic factors, “social and environmental factors” may affect 
the development of breast cancer.180 
 
 172. See discussion infra Parts IV.A.1-9. 
 173. See Press Release PXE International, supra note 39. 
 174. Nancie Petrucell et al., BRCA1 and BRCA2 Hereditary Breast/Ovarian Cancer, 
(last revision Sept. 3, 2004), GENEREVIEWS, available at http://www.genetests.org/ 
servlet/access?db=geneclinics&site=gt&id=8888891&key=m41BLW6o3jUNg&gry=
&fcn=y&fw=Di2T&filename=/profiles/brca1/index.html. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Williams-Jones & Burgess, supra note 146, at 123. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id.  There is some genetic association of Chek2, BRCA2, ESR1, CYP1B1, 
COMT, PGR, BRCA1, VEGF, TGFB, CYP17, HSD17B1, patched, sulfotransferase 
1A1, HER2 codon 655, NAT2, VDR, XRCC2, TP53, EBAG9, ADRB2, MnSOD, 
HER-2/neu, CYP19, AR, PR, IGFBP7, GSTP1, RB1, cerbB2, estrogen receptor, 
cHaras1, and Lmyc genes with breast cancer. Genetic Association Database, 
National Institute on Aging, available at http://geneticassociationdb.nih.gov (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2004) (searching on “breast cancer” results in a list of genes 
associated with the disease).   
 180. See Williams-Jones & Burgess, supra note 146, at 124. 
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Myriad Genetics (Myriad) controls the testing for BRCA1 and 
BRCA2, and retains exclusive licenses for the use of the genes in 
diagnostic testing.181  Myriad initially charged $2,400 for both the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 tests and currently charges a list price of 
$2,975.182  The cost of these tests is high because they require 
sequencing 35,000 base pairs of DNA.183  The company negotiated a 
deal with the National Cancer Institute in 2002 and, as a result, 
reduced licensing fees to $1,200 for combined BRCA1 and BRCA2 
testing, $600 for BRCA1 alone, and $750 for BRCA2 alone.184 
Myriad noted in its annual report that its profit margin from 
the diagnostics testing business is sixty-eight percent.185  For the 
fiscal year ending June 30, 2004, Myriad’s estimated cost of testing 
is $944.186  Estimates of the cost of contract sequencing a gene 
alone, without the cost of oligonucleotide synthesis, is between 
$945 and $1,050.187  Myriad estimates that it spent $2 million to 
develop the genetic tests for BRCA1 and BRCA2.  In 2004, Myriad 
reported a net loss of $40.6 million188 due to its research 
 
 181. See Kimberly Blanton, Corporate Takeover Exploiting the US Patent System: A 
Single Company Has Gained Control over Genetic Research and Testing for Breast Cancer, 
and Scientists, Doctors, and Patients Have to Play by Its Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 
2002, at 10, available at 2002 WL 4113872; MATTHEW RIMMER, Myriad Genetics: Patent 
Law and Genetic Testing, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 20 (2003). 
 182. David B. Resnik, Are DNA Patents Bad for Medicine?, 65 HEALTH POLICY 181, 
186 (2002). BRACAnalysis® analysis for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer 
involves sequencing the genes in both directions for a total of approximately 
35,000 bp, costs $2,975, and is covered by all major health maintenance 
organizations. Myriad Genetics, Inc., SEC Annual Report (Form 10-K) for fiscal 
year ending June 30, 2004, [hereinafter Myriad 10-K] at http://www.edgar-
online.com/bin/cobrand/?doc=A-8999230001047469-04-028434&nav=1&form 
type=10%2DK. 
 183. Telephone Interview with Bill Rusconi, Vice President of Marketing, 
Myriad Genetics (September 24, 2004). 
 184. Resnik, supra note 182, at 186. 
 185. See Myriad 10-K, supra note 182. 
 186. Id.  Profit margins have steadily increased for fiscal years ending June 30: 
in 2001 profits were 56.68% of sales; in 2002 profits were 60.1% of sales; in 2003 
profits were 63.81% of sales; and in 2004 profits were 68.24% of sales.  Id.  Based 
on profit margins for 2004, the cost alone of running tests would be $619 for 
MLH1 and MSH2 (hereditary nonpolypopsis colorectal cancer syndrome) and 
$535 for APC (familial adenomatous polyposis). Services and Price List, Myriad 
Genetics Laboratories, Inc., (effective as of 02/15/04).  The ratio of tests done for 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 to those done for MLH1 and MSH2 is between five and ten to 
one. Rusconi, supra note 183. 
 187. E-mail from David Gingrich, DNA Sequencing, Colorado State University, 
to Edward Weck, student, William Mitchell College of Law (Sept. 27, 2004, 
14:27:22 CST) (on file with author). 
 188. See Myriad 10-K, supra note 182, at 4. 
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expenditures in developing therapeutics, including Flurizan, its 
lead therapeutic candidate for the treatment of Alzheimer’s 
disease.189 
2. Canavan Disease 
The Greenbergs had two children who both developed 
Canavan disease.190  The Greenbergs decided to lead an effort to 
identify the gene for the disease so that their children’s struggle 
with the disease would not be in vain.191  They worked with Dr. 
Reuben Matalon, a physician working at the University of Illinois 
Hospital in Chicago.192  The Greenbergs helped Dr. Matalon obtain 
tissue samples from other children suffering from Canavan disease 
and their parents.193  The Greenbergs also raised donations and 
grants.194  The Miami Children’s Hospital (MCH) hired Dr. 
Matalon to establish a center for research on genetic diseases.195  In 
1993, Dr. Matalon isolated the Canavan gene and MCH applied for 
a patent on the gene.196  Dr. Matalon assigned all of his rights to the 
gene in his contract to MCH.197  MCH charges $12.50 per test to 
laboratories that perform the test.198  The Greenbergs sued MCH 
and lost.199  Genzyme currently provides Canavan testing for $225.200 
3. Hereditary Hemochromatosis 
Hereditary hemochromatosis is a common autosomal recessive 
disease with as many as 80 to 85% of the cases caused by the two 
most common alleles of the HFE gene (C282Y and H63D).201  
 
 189. See id. at 3 (providing that Flurizan recently completed phase I of human 
clinical trials). 
 190. See Resnik, supra note 182, at 185. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id.; U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635 (issued Oct. 21, 1997). Canavan disease was 
shown to be a mutation in the aspartoacylase gene resulting in accumulation of N-
acetylaspartic acid in the brain.  Id. 
 197. Resnik, supra note 182, at 185. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id.  See generally Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Res. Inst., Inc., 208 
F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 200. Telephone Interview with Customer Service, Genzyme Genetics (Oct. 26, 
2004) [hereinafter Genzyme Interview]. 
 201. Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test, 415 NATURE 577, 577 
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Testing for hemochromatosis requires a PCR amplification step.  
Bio-Rad Laboratories (Bio-Rad) currently holds the rights to 
hemochromatosis testing and either requires purchase of reagents 
from Bio-Rad or a license to perform the test in the laboratory.202  
Bio-Rad charges $84 for the chemicals required for the test.203  Bio-
Rad charges royalties up to $20 per test.204  One clinical laboratory 
charges $163 for the hemochromatosis test.205  A survey of clinical 
laboratories testing for hereditary hemochromatosis showed that 
limiting testing to the patented test discouraged the development 
of better or less-expensive tests.206  Bio-Rad, however, has entered 
into an exclusive licensing agreement with Nanogen for use of the 
hemochromatosis test on a proprietary nanochip system.207  The 
patents on these alleles expire during 2015 and 2016.208 
A quick survey of the European Patent Office databases shows 
that there are a number of new patent applications for 
hemochromatosis testing.209  Some applications are by other 
research groups and others are follow-on inventions from the 
 
(Feb. 7, 2002). 
 202. Id. at 578. 
 203. Reagents for twenty-four tests cost $2016.  Product no. 406-1262, mDx 
Hereditary Hemochromatosis ASR, Bio-Rad Laboratories, available at http://www. 
biorad.com (last visited Jan. 11, 2005). 
 204. See Merz, supra note 201, at 579. 
 205. CompGene Fees, at http://www.compgene.com/fees.htm (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2005) [hereinafter CompGene Fees]. 
 206. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 207. Bio-Rad Enters Licensing Deal With Nanogen, East Bay Business Times, 
available at http://www.bizjournals.com/eastbay/stories/2002/06/24/daily 
27.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2005) (quoting John Goetz, vice president of Bio-
Rad's clinical diagnostics group, as saying "The demand for molecular-based tests 
used to detect genetic disorders continues to increase, and we believe the 
agreement with Nanogen will help accelerate that trend by providing laboratories 
a greater variety of licensed hemochromatosis testing options."). 
 208. U.S. Patent No. 5,705,343 (issued Jan. 6, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,712,098 
(issued Jan. 27, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,753,438 (issued May 19, 1998). 
 209. U.S. Patent Application No. 2,004,101,868 (published May 27, 2004).  
Entitled “Analysis method for hemochromatosis mutation,” the abstract posits that 
it is “possible to combine three concepts each known separately in prior art from 
different sources: allele specific PCR, mutagenically separated PCR, and amplicon 
identification by specific dissociation curves.”  Id.  In addition this method was 
claimed to be “significantly more straightforward and economic” than those is the 
prior art.  Id.  U.S. Patent Application No. 2,004,086,862 (published May 6, 2004) 
(entitled “Method and probes for the genetic diagnosis of hemochromatosis,” and 
claiming methods and probes for hybridizing with nucleic acids with HFE 
mutations in a biological sample); U.S. Patent Application No. 2,003,148,972 
(published Aug. 7, 2003) (entitled “Hereditary hemochromatosis gene” and 
consists of a follow-on invention from original inventors). 
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group that patented the original sequence.  This shows that 
innovation has not been completely stifled by the patenting of the 
gene. 
4. Huntington’s Disease 
The test for Huntington’s Disease (HD) requires a 
determination of the number of CAG repeats in the 5’ coding 
sequence.210  The CAG repeat is expanded in individuals with 
Huntington’s Disease.211  The assay is a Southern blot and 
approximately 85 to 93% of individuals with HD can be correctly 
diagnosed.212  Currently, no treatment for the disease exists.  
Quotes for the cost of Huntington’s Disease testing are between 
$190 and $200 per test.213 
5. Cystic Fibrosis 
Cystic fibrosis is the most common disease in humans but 
there is currently no simple test available for genetic testing 
because a large number of different genetic mutations can result in 
the disease.214  Because of this genetic complexity, the American 
College of Medical Genetics recommended a panel of twenty-five 
common alleles for testing.215  The gene was patented and licensed 
non-exclusively for $2 per test.216  Cystic fibrosis testing with this 
panel costs between $150 and $300.217 
 
 210. Brendan Haigh, Huntington Disease, GENEREVIEWS, at 
http://www.genetests. org (last modified May 25, 2004). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Genzyme Interview, supra note 200; CompGene Fees, supra note 205. 
 214. Cystic fibrosis is caused by mutations in the gene encoding the cystic 
fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR).  Gregory P. Lekovic, 
Genetic Diagnosis and Intellectual Property Rights: A Proposal to Amend The Physician 
Immunity Statute, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 275, 276 n.6 (2004). 
 215. Moskowitz et al., CFTR-Related Disorders, GENEREVIEWS, at 
http://www.genetests.org/ (last modified Aug. 24, 2004). 
 216. U.S. Patent No. 5,776,677 (issued July 7, 1998); Peter Gorner, Parents 
Suing over Patenting of Genetic Test They Say the Researchers They Assisted are Trying to 
Profit from a Test for a Rare Disease, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2000, at 1, available at 2000 
WL 3735425. 
 217. CompGene Fees, supra note 205; Genzyme Interview, supra note 200; 
Telephone Interview with Chrissi Coolbaugh, Client Services, Ambry Genetics 
(Oct. 26, 2004) (noting that Ambry Genetics charges $200 for three selected 
mutations, or for sequencing the entire gene, $450 for patients and $495 for 
institutions). 
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6. Alzheimer’s disease 
Alzheimer’s Disease remains the most common cause of 
dementia in North America and Europe.218  There is currently no 
curative treatment.219  There is a significant association of the 
disease with the Apolipoprotein E (ApoE) gene.220  Duke 
University, with NIH funding, developed the test for ApoE 
alterations and Athena Diagnostics holds the exclusive license.221  
Testing for the ApoE gene from Athena Diagnostics costs between 
$295 and $450.222 
7. Familial Colon Cancer 
Hereditary Non-Polyposis Colon Cancer (HNPCC) is 
associated with mutations in four genes in the mismatch repair 
pathway.223  Mutations in two of these genes, MLH1 and MSH2, 
account for approximately ninety percent of detected mutations in 
families with HNPCC.224  Myriad tests for two of the four genes 
involved in (HNPCC), MLH1 and MSH2.  The cost is $1,950225 and 
requires approximately sixty-seven percent of the sequencing 
required for the BRCA1 and BRCA1 sequences.226  Ambry Genetics, 
a competitor of Myriad, sequences the same two genes for an 
institutional cost of $1,395 and a patient cost of $1,295.227 
 
 218. Thomas D. Bird, Alzheimer Disease Overview, GENEREVIEWS, (last revision on 
Dec. 22, 2004), available at http://www.genetests.org/. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. U.S. Patent No. 5,508,167 (issued Apr. 16, 1996). 
 222. The lower charge is for billing facilities and the higher charge is for 
billing commercial insurance. Telephone Interview with Customer Service, Athena 
Diagnostics (Oct. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Athena]. 
 223. Wendy Kohlmann & Stephen B. Gruber, Hereditary Non-Polyposis Colon 
Cancer, GENEREVIEWS (Feb. 5, 2004), available at http://www.genetests.org/. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Comprehensive COLARIS® analysis for familial colorectal cancer by 
sequencing MLH1 and MSH2 (about two-thirds as many bases as BRCA1 and 
BRCA2) is $1950 and is covered by all major health maintenance organizations. See 
Myriad 10-K, supra note 182. 
 226. See Rusconi, supra note 183. 
 227. E-mail from Chrissi Coolbaugh, Client Services, Ambry Genetics, to 
Edward Weck, student, William Mitchell College of Law (Oct. 29, 2004, 14:33:03 
CST) (on file with author).  Sequence of either MLH1 or MSH2 costs $700 for the 
patient and $750 for an institution.  Id. 
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8. Duchenne’s Muscular Dystrophy 
Molecular genetic testing of the Duchenne Muscular 
Dystrophy (DMD) gene is available clinically and can establish the 
disease diagnosis without a muscle biopsy in the majority of DMD 
cases and Becker Muscular Dystrophy.228  The cost of testing ranges 
from $425 to $695.229 
9. Spinocerebellar Ataxias 
There are a number of genes, which affect spinocerebellar 
ataxias (SCA).230  The University of Minnesota, with NIH funding, 
developed the SCA-1 genetic test, and Athena Diagnostics holds the 
patent and exclusive license.231  The cost for the SCA-1 test, and 
other SCA tests individually, is $395 to $550.232 
B. Positions of Professional Associations on Genetic Testing 
The Council on Governmental Regulations (Council) is an 
association of research universities that has been involved in the 
development of financial and administrative aspects of federally 
funded research since 1948.233  The Council complained about the 
process involved in adjusting the licensing practices.234  The 
Council believes this is an example of NIH amending its granting 
regulations and requirements with little, if any, formal process.235  
The Council is unsure if data supports NIH assumptions.236 
The executive board of the Academy of Clinical Laboratory 
Physicians and Scientists’ (ACLPS)237 approved its resolution 
 
 228. Bruce R. Korf et al., Dystrophinopathies, GENEREVIEWS (Oct. 1, 2004), at 
http://www.genetests.org. 
 229. See Athena, supra note 222. 
 230. There are tests for Spinocerebellar Ataxia Type 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14 
and 17. See GeneTests, supra note 20. 
 231. U.S. Patent No. 5,741,645 (issued Apr. 21, 1998). 
 232. See Athena, supra note 222. 
 233. Council on Governmental Relations, Agenda: Meeting at the Council of 
Governmental Relations 10-14, available at http://206.151.87.67/docs/AgendaJune 
04.doc (last visited Jan. 21, 2005). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Academy of Clinical Laboratory Physicians and Scientists, ACLPS 
Resolution: Exclusive Licenses for Diagnostic Tests Approved by the ACLPS Executive 
Council (June 3, 1999), available at http://depts.washington.edu/lmaclps/ 
license.htm. 
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regarding exclusive licenses for diagnostic tests.  The resolution 
recommends: 
Physicians and scientists should oppose patent licensing 
agreements that inappropriately limit clinical care, 
medical training, and medical research; Government and 
non-profit institutions that hold patents controlling in 
vitro diagnostic testing services should not issue exclusive 
licenses for these patents unless there is a clear and 
compelling need for exclusivity in order to make the 
technology available to the public.  Such cases are 
expected to be extremely rare; when patent holders 
choose to require royalty-bearing licenses for use of their 
technology for in vitro diagnostic testing, such licenses 
should be nonexclusive and available to any qualified, 
CLIA-certified laboratory on an equal basis.  Financial 
terms for such licenses should be reasonable; license 
agreements should be free of any terms that dictate 
specific methods of testing, methods of reporting results, 
or clinical uses of the test.238 
The American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG) also 
issued a position statement on genetic testing: 
The decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
to permit the patenting of naturally occurring genes and 
disease-causing mutations has produced numerous 
difficulties... Enforcement has been effected in one or 
more of these ways: monopolistic licensing that limits a 
given genetic test to a single laboratory, royalty-based 
licensing agreements with exorbitant up-front fees and 
per-test fees, and licensing agreements that seek 
proportions of reimbursement from testing services. 
These limit the accessibility of competitively priced 
genetic testing services and hinder test-specific 
development of national programs for quality assurance.  
They also limit the number of knowledgeable individuals 
who can assist physicians, laboratory geneticists and 
counselors in the diagnosis, management and care of at-
risk patients. Further, restricting the availability of gene 
testing has long-term implications beyond patient care.  It 
affects the training of the next generation of medical and 
laboratory geneticists, physicians, and scientists in the area 
enveloped by the patent or license.  It also retards the 
 
 238. Id. 
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usually very rapid improvement of a test that occurs 
through the addition of new mutations or the use of new 
techniques by numerous laboratories that have 
accumulated samples from affected individuals over many 
years.  Therefore, it is the ACMG’s position that: Genes 
and their mutations are naturally occurring substances 
that should not be patented.  Patents on genes with 
clinical implications must be very broadly licensed.  
Licensing agreements should not limit access through 
excessive royalties and other unreasonable terms.239 
C. Is This New Rulemaking Justified? 
Genetic testing requires balancing a variety of interests.  The 
rights of the patient, the patent holder, the government funding 
agency, the doctor and the insurance company all need to be 
considered.240  Protection of these interests requires “patient 
choice, neutral genetic counseling, physician involvement, and 
regulation of process and information management.”241 
If health care providers can be convinced that the predictive 
savings from diagnostic tests offset the cost of testing, they will be 
willing to reimburse the costs of testing.242  However, if an 
individual is not part of an insurance pool, e.g., lacks insurance 
through employment, then genetic discrimination may become a 
possibility.243  This possibility varies from state to state.  One 
commentator noted that genetic “counselors ‘routinely advise’ 
clients not to pursue health insurance reimbursement because of 
the ‘potential risk in obtaining future health and life insurance.’”244 
There is empirical evidence of negative effects for exclusive 
licensing.  This note’s brief survey of commercialized genetic tests 
shows that the monopoly right granted by patent exclusive 
 
 239. American College of Medical Genetics, Position Statement of Gene Patents 
and Accessibility of Gene Testing, (Aug. 2, 1999), available at http://genetics.faseb.org 
/genetics/acmg/pol-34.htm. 
 240. See Allen C. Nunnally, Commercialized Genetic Testing: The Role of Corporate 
Biotechnology in the New Genetic Age, 8 B.U.J. SCI. TECH. L. 306 (2002) (reviewing “the 
prominent problems that underlie commercialized genetic testing” and offering 
recommendations for commercialized diagnostic genetic testing). 
 241. Id. at 337. 
 242. See Chahine, supra note 104, at 419. 
 243. See Jennifer S. Geetter, Coding for Change: The Power of the Human Genome to 
Transform the American Health Insurance System, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 44-56 (2002) 
(analyzing, in part, the health insurance industry and the states regulation of it). 
 244. Id. at 51. 
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licensing results in increased costs to licensees.245  Although it is 
very difficult to make head-to-head comparisons of genetic tests for 
different diseases, as each genetic defect is unique and the 
concomitant tests differ in complexity, the evidence indicates that 
exclusive licenses increase the cost of testing two to three-fold.246  
Some laboratories have discontinued using specific tests.247  In 
other markets outside the United States, the increased prices have 
had a documented effect on the delivery of health care.248  The 
evidence is strongest for a decline in breast cancer testing (BRCA1 
and BRCA2) in Canada and the European Union.249 
A large number of independent laboratories carry out genetic 
tests.  Most of the tests utilize routine molecular biological 
techniques and reagents that should be easily transferable from a 
scientific publication.  Some university laboratories have the time 
and inclination to develop laboratory tests from published recipes.  
Conversely, not all laboratories will want to develop their own tests 
and will instead find satisfaction by purchasing reagents (ASRs) 
from commercial research test developers.  The commercial 
production of reagents would increase both quality and price, but 
these price increases would not match those associated with 
patented tests. 
For example, reagent costs are probably higher for genetic 
tests with a requirement for synthetic oligonucleotides.  Non-
exclusive licensing might switch development to reagent companies 
instead of to companies that are providing genetic testing services.  
Laboratories could establish consortia for purchasing specialized 
reagents. 
 
 245. See supra Part IV. 
 246. Id. 
 247. See supra Part II.F. 
 248. See Williams-Jones & Burgess, supra note 146, at 119-20, 125.  The 
patenting of the BRCA genes led to a tripling of prices in Canada.  See Bryn 
Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and Application of 
Commercial BRCA Testing 10 HEALTH L.J. 123, 142 (2002) (describing the patenting 
by Myriad Genetics of the genes BRCA1 and BRCA2, which are associated with 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer).  From July 2001 to February 2003, in-house 
BRCA testing was halted at the Hereditary Cancer Agency at the British Columbia 
Cancer Agency in Vancouver, British Columbia.  Id.  The Institut Curie in Paris, 
France argues that the Myriad BRCA testing misses 10 to 20% of mutations 
jeopardizing the quality and usefulness of the information.  Id. at 139.  Complying 
with patent requirements would result in an estimated additional cost of thirty-six-
million francs ($4.8 million) to hospital budgets.  Id. 
 249. See Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and 
Application of Commerical BRCA Testing, 10 Health L.J. 123 (2002). 
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It will be important under the new draft guidelines to 
distinguish the non-exclusive and exclusive licensing categories 
created by the “when possible” and “when necessary” language.250  
The first consideration would be the number of interested 
potential licensees for a specific genetic test.  If there were only one 
potential licensee, the use of milestones and benchmarks would 
ensure the development of the technology.251  This would also 
ensure licensing of the genetic test.  The second consideration 
would be the number of individuals affected by the disease.  The 
Orphan Drug Act defines a “rare disease or condition” for 
development of drugs as “any disease or condition which . . . affects 
less than 200,000 persons in the United States . . . .”252  This 
number, or another appropriate number of affected individuals, 
could be used to determine the genetic test for which exclusive 
licensing would be necessary.  The third consideration might 
include the complexity of the test for the disease, because the cost 
of testing relates directly to the number of mutations causing the 
disease.  When establishing criteria for exclusive licensing, a 
proposed regulation must require that newly developed genetic 
tests not be frequently monopoly-priced. 
A broad definition of “research use” is imperative under the 
proposed rulemaking.  This broad definition becomes especially 
important with genetic diseases because the initial observations of 
allele prevalence may vary following analysis of different ethnic 
subpopulations.  Ongoing research with the genetic tools is 
essential to improve genetic testing for a particular disease. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The non-exclusive licensing of genetic tests, as recommended 
in NIH’s new rulemaking, is necessary to allow potentially affected 
individuals broad access to genetic testing.253  It is also necessary to 
strike a balance between encouraging further development of 
genetic tests with federal funding, patent protection for university 
research, and development of that technology into viable 
commercial products and broad access to health care.254 
 
 250. See supra Part III. 
 251. Licensing Genomic Inventions, supra note 1, at 67748. 
 252. 21 U.S.C.A. § 360ee (b)(2) (West 2001). 
 253. See supra Part III. 
 254. Id. 
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Patenting of genes for genetic testing has different standards 
in the United States and Europe.255  The United States’ standard for 
patenting DNA sequences requires a specific and substantial utility, 
and the United States grants more patents with broader coverage 
than the European standards allow.256  Europeans have expressed 
great concern that increasing patent coverage for genetic testing 
will negatively influence healthcare access and costs.257 
The enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act more than twenty years 
ago has been a boon for university technology transfer departments 
and an additional source of income for universities.258  Patents and 
licenses on biological inventions were incentives that furthered the 
development of the biotechnology industry.259  Concurrently, the 
reduction in breadth of the experimental use exception has 
reduced academic experimentation that could be undertaken to 
support further development and understanding of population 
effects of genetic tests.260 
Survey evidence from various laboratories indicates that 
patenting of diagnostic tests reduces the amount of 
experimentation at local laboratories.  It has been suggested that 
the anticommons effect on upstream inventions has stifled 
downstream inventions.261  Academic positions have been proffered 
on both sides of the anticommons divide.262  For those who see an 
anticommons problem, solutions include compulsory licensing, 
non-exclusive patents, and expanded access to diagnostic testing.263  
As the number of pharmacogenetic tests expands in the future, 
assuring access to genetic testing will become increasingly 
important. 
Each disease diagnostic is unique.  It is not possible to 
compare the average price of an exclusively licensed test to a non-
exclusively licensed test.264  The cost of a genetic test is determined 
by the complexity, variety and number of genetic variants, and the 
 
 255. See supra Part II.B-C. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and 
Application of Commerical BRCA Testing, 10 Health L.J. 123 (2002). 
 258. See supra Part II.D. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See supra Part II.E. 
 261. See supra Part II.G. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. See supra Part IV. 
34
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss3/10
10WECK.DOC 3/13/2005  4:31:31 PM 
2005] EXCLUSIVE LICENSING OF DNA DIAGNOSTICS 1091 
complexity of the technique involved (DNA sequencing or other 
allelism tests).265  The more complex tests have higher costs as well 
as attendant monopoly costs associated with patent rights.266  Using 
the BRCA test as an example, the cost of providing the test in a 
dedicated laboratory is one-third of the market list price.267  These 
increased costs can make it necessary to reduce overall testing in 
order to pay for testing for selected individuals.268  A number of 
professional associations have spoken out against the patenting of 
genes for diagnostic tests or for the use of non-exclusive licensing 
provisions.269   
The non-exclusive licensing of DNA diagnostics is necessary to 
ensure that genetic tests are widely available at reasonable costs.  
The policy of federally funding research to promote basic 
discoveries must be balanced with mechanisms for rapidly 
developing those technologies at reasonable costs that then 
support laboratory implementation within a suitable time frame. 
 
 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
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